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He is the author or editor of numerous publications including books and articles. This is a publication of an address by Prof. Luzius Wildhaber on the occasion of RGSL's Inauguration during the seminar "Discrimination Issues -new trends in the European legal framework" in Riga, on March 8, 2001. There can be no doubt that in the fifty years since the Convention was adopted the perception of what is meant by discrimination and of who can be the object of discrimination has altered significantly. The diversity of modern societies, changes in moral and social values and in the understanding of gender roles and sexual orientation, greater accessibility to services and information, increased international and national mobility, these are some of the factors that have heightened awareness of difference of treatment. The perception of discrimination as, primarily, intentional unfavourable treatment of a section of the community has given way to a broader notion embracing unintentional or even traditional differentiation and more recently recognition that discrimination may be indirect, where identical treatment has disproportionately adverse effects on members of a particular group. The Convention prides itself as being a living instrument and the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights has reflected this. Changing attitudes to unmarried mothers, children born out of wedlock and homosexuals have for example been recognised. However, the accessory nature of the Convention guarantee, which is at least in part symptomatic of how the issue was viewed at the time, has tended to mean that the discrimination aspect of such cases has remained in the background and this may have obscured the treatment of the question by the European Court of Human Rights. The Court's attitude has perhaps not been entirely coherent as to the weight to be given to the nondiscrimination guarantee. The recent judgment of Thlimmenos is evidence of a new approach and the opening for signature of a new Protocol, No. 12, setting down a general and free-standing prohibition of discrimination will no doubt extend the scope of the protection against discrimination afforded by the Convention.
But let me start with some older cases and look more closely at the accessory nature of the Convention guarantee and the way it has operated. In the first case in which the European Court of Human Rights was called upon to consider the application of Article 14 of the Convention, the so-called Belgian Linguistic case 1 , the Belgian Government argued that Article 14 "served no practical legal purpose and that its presence was purely psychological in intention". While this contention is now of largely historical interest, the qualified nature of the non-discrimination guarantee in the European Convention on Human
Rights has over the years been the target of criticism, both inside and outside the Court has found a violation of another of the substantive provisions, it has tended, with some exceptions, to avoid examining additionally the issues that might be raised from the point of view of discrimination. In one sense this is hardly astonishing in view of the frequent overlap between breaches of the main substantive guarantees and of the non-discrimination provision. The thrust of the Convention as a whole is directed against unjustified arbitrariness as being inimical to the rule of law. It is moreover inherent in the rule of law that the law should be applied in an equal manner. A finding of arbitrary interference with fundamental rights will commonly imply an element of unjust difference of treatment, thus rendering to some extent superfluous a further finding as to the discriminatory nature of the interference. The Court's prudence in this area may also be explained by the fact that, according to the traditional notion of discrimination, a finding of discrimination will often be understood as attributing a degree of discreditable motivation to the authorities concerned, an allegation which may be and usually is difficult to substantiate, particularly at international level. Finally, the finding of a discrimination in some contexts will be tantamount to the finding of the existence of a practice of Convention violations, which the Court has shied away from, preferring to limit its review to the facts of the case before it.
But to begin at the beginning: the Court had first to set to rest the idea that Article 14 had no practical function whatsoever. In the Belgian Linguistic case, the Court rejected the Belgian Government's argument to that effect. It held that a measure, which in itself was in conformity with the requirements of the article enshrining the right or freedom in question, might infringe that Article As the Court pertinently noted, "national authorities are frequently confronted with situations and problems, which on account of differences inherent therein, call for different situations" and "certain legal inequalities tend only to correct factual inequalities". Difference of treatment was therefore not discriminatory within the meaning of the Convention if it had a reasonable and objective justification, in other words if it pursued a legitimate aim and there was a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be realised. Referring to the subsidiary nature of the Convention system, the Court recognised, without yet using the term margin of appreciation, that national authorities were free to choose the measures that they considered appropriate in such matters. States thus enjoyed a certain discretion in assessing Rasmussen also established that in order to be able to invoke Article 14 not only is it not necessary to make out a violation of one of the other substantive
Articles, but it is not even necessary to claim such a violation, that is to rely on the substantive Article in isolation as well taken together with Article 14. In Inze v. This was another facet of the prohibition of discrimination under Article 14.
Applying the traditional test, the Court proceeded to examine whether the failure to treat the applicant differently had pursued a legitimate aim and concluded that the State had no legitimate interest in excluding from the profession of chartered accountant persons whose conviction could not imply any dishonesty or moral turpitude likely to undermine the offenders' ability to exercise this profession.
There was not therefore a reasonable and objective justification for failing to treat the applicant differently.
Thlimmenos does, it seems to me, take the Court's case-law on discrimination into new territory. This is firstly because of its emphasis on a positive aspect, that is the need, at least in certain circumstances, to make special arrangements for persons in special categories. In this sense the Court stated, and I quote, "the right not be discriminated against in the enjoyment of the rights guaranteed under the Convention is also violated when States without an objective and reasonable justification fail to treat differently persons whose situations are significantly different." One obvious category of persons whose situations will very often be different is that of disabled persons. But Thlimmenos is also significant because it is probably the case in which the link between the main Article and the alleged discrimination is the most remote. He was not excluded from his chosen profession because of his religious beliefs, but because he had a previous conviction, which was linked to his religious beliefs. This considerably widens the notion of ambit as hitherto understood by the Court. This more expansive approach may also, as I suggested in my introduction, reflect the fact that there has been a move away from the notion of discrimination as solely differential treatment based on a covert and usually unavowable intention to distinguish one group from another to recognition that discrimination may be indirect.
As to the question whether Thlimmenos represented a new departure, the officials of the Council of Europe's Directorate General of Human Rights who were piloting the draft Protocol No.12 through the different stages of the drafting process, said that they were alarn1ed at the adverse effect this judgment might have on the prospects of securing the adoption of the text. In the event it was adopted and opened for signature last November. I do not want to go into the Protocol in too much detail, nor in any way prejudge how it will be applied and interpreted by the Court. I can say, however, that it provides a clear legal basis for examining discrimination issues not currently covered by Article 14. In fact when the Court was consulted on the draft, one of its concerns was the practical one of how it would cope with the inevitable increase in case-load that would result. The explanatory report makes clear that the combined effect of the two paragraphs of Article 1 of the Protocol is that all situations where an individual might be discriminated against by a public authority are covered. There are of course Let me conclude at this point. The non-discrimination provision has been at least to some extent a second-class guarantee over much of the period in which the Convention has been in force. Its accessory nature has indeed prevented an evolution more in line with contemporary more activist and also more political understandings of discrimination. The most recent developments promise to give a new lease of life to the protection against discrimination under the Convention and a development which may well be more consistent with the complex issues of equality that arise in modern society.
